Jun.-Prof. Neubert

Jun.-Prof. Dr. Max-Frederik Neubert

Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft (FWW)
Universitätsplatz 2, 39106 Magdeburg, G22D-203
Publikationen

2018

Begutachteter Zeitschriftenartikel

Accountability in an agency model - project selection, effort incentives, and contract design

Lukas, Christian; Neubert, Max-Frederik; Schöndube, Jens Robert

In: Managerial and decision economics: MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics - Chichester [u.a.]: Wiley, 2018[Online first]

Projekte

Abgeschlossene Projekte

Costs and benefits of discretion in performance evaluation and patterns of bias
Laufzeit: 15.05.2018 bis 31.12.2021

This paper investigates incentive effects from subjective performance evaluation in an agency setting. A manager (agent) is evaluated by his superior (principal) via a subjective performance report. Naturally, the superior is able to distort the report. Assuming a fairness-sensitive manager, his response to a percieved reporting bias is not straightforward. His reaction to an undervaluation is always negative, his reaction to overvaluation, in contrast, not unequivocally positive, due to fairness issues. Within this setting, we
find that reporting discretion can be either bene
cial or detrimental to the principal. In particular, the option to bias renders incentive provision more costly but also reduces the agent's exposure to risk in the optimal contract. Moreover, we
find that frequently observed bias patterns such as centrality bias and leniency bias arise endogenously in our model.

Projekt im Forschungsportal ansehen

Earnings management during family firm succession: an analytical perspective of the influence of socioemotional wealth
Laufzeit: 15.05.2018 bis 31.12.2021

In order to provide an analytical explanation for earnings management in family firms prior to a succession, we study a two-period agency setting in which a founder can invest in the future capital stock and may engage in earnings management. We examine two succession scenarios which differ in terms of who lead the firm in the second period. To capture dynastic and altruistic motives of the founder, we incorporate the behavioral concept of socioemotional wealth (SEW). Our model shows that SEW creates manipulation incentives. We find that the founder engages in both accrual-based and real earnings management in order to reduce inheritance tax payments for the offspring.  We  show how the successor’s productivity, inheritance taxation, and internal monitoring influence the founder’s choice between a family-member and an external manager as the future CEO.

Projekt im Forschungsportal ansehen

Experimental evidence on project choice and accountability
Laufzeit: 15.05.2018 bis 31.12.2021

We investigate how decision making is affected when the decider knows s/he is held accountable for the decision or the outcome. In a laboratory experiment, we analyze different treatments where agents have to choose a project from a set of investment opportunities. In one setting, agents face pressure to justify their project choice if profits become negative. In two other settings, agents either have to justify their decisions irrespective of the project outcome or dependent on a state of nature. We test hypotheses derived from a simple model and find support for them: accountability reduces the likelihood of the project with higher return and risk being chosen though the extent depends on the type of accountability. However, higher profit shares for the agent or a project recommendation by the principal can offset that effect to some extent. Our results have implications for controlling investment decisions.

Projekt im Forschungsportal ansehen

Sustainable Investment Timing under Career Concerns, Agency, and Information
Laufzeit: 01.01.2021 bis 31.12.2021

To provide an analytical explanation for delayed investments and low commitment to sustainability projects, we analyze a dynamic real option model where a manager (the agent) is responsible for the timing and scaling strategy of investment decisions. There are two types of projects available, one with lower investment costs but lower commitment to sustainability, i.e., lower scale (type I), and another with higher investment cost but higher sustainability commitment (type II). The owner (principal) employs the manager because he has an informational advantage about project costs and a specific reputation in the field of sustainability. A higher reputation increases the expected profitability of the project. However, the manager has career concerns and since he needs to publicly report on the sustainability progress, pressure on the manager increases as well, i.e., he will suffer reputational damage if the commitment to sustainability is not large enough. To design the optimal contract, the principal has to incorporate a potential reputation damage compensation into the contract in addition to incentives to disclose private information truthfully. We analyze the owner’s trade-off between the costs of the manager’s sustainability pressure due to early but low commitment (realization of type I) and lower payoffs in a later but potentially larger investment in sustainability (realization of type II). In contrast to existing literature, we find that higher managerial reputation leads to a strategy change in the type I project, delaying investment and increasing scale. We also show that the owner has to trade-off sustainability contracting costs against project financial performance when choosing a manager with a particular reputation.

Projekt im Forschungsportal ansehen

Verhaltensökonomische Einflüsse nicht-finanzieller Berichterstattung auf Investmentverhalten - Erkenntnisse einer Eye Tracking Studie
Laufzeit: 01.09.2020 bis 31.12.2021

Immer häufiger berüksichtigen Aktionäre und andere Stakeholder den Einfluss von Unternehmen auf ihre Umwelt, in gesellschaftlicher oder ökologischer Hinsicht. Unternehmen und Politik reagieren hierauf mit neuen Forderungen an die (nicht-finanzielle) Berichterstattung und Berichtsinstrumenten. Fraglich ist jedoch, ob und in welcher Form diese Berichterstattung die Bewertung der Unternehmenslage beeinflusst. Insbesondere kann hier die große Freiheit der Art und Weise der Berichterstattung als problematisch identifiziert werden.

Mit Hilfe neuer experimenteller Methoden, insbesondere Eye Tracking, untersuchen wir den Einfluss dieser nichtfinanziellen Angaben auf Stakeholder Beurteilungen. Ziel ist es, ein besseres Verständnis über die Wirkweise solcher Berichtsinstrumente zu erlangen, um effektive und nachhaltige Modelle der Berichterstattung zu entwickeln.

Das Projekt wird finanziell unterstützt von der Gesellschaft für experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung (GfeW) e.V.

Projekt im Forschungsportal ansehen

Accountability in an agency model: project selection, effort incentives, and contract design
Laufzeit: 15.05.2018 bis 27.10.2019

We analyze an agency model of project choice and implementation where the agent is held accountable for his performance. We show that implementation of the ex ante efficient  project may be impossible, irrespective of how the principal sets fixed wage and bonus rate. If it is possible, the principal may be forced to increase the bonus rate above the optimal project-specific rate. The higher profit share compensates the agent for pressure he faces when he has to justify/explain his performance.

Projekt im Forschungsportal ansehen

Kooperationen
  • Dr. Barbara Pirchegger
  • Prof. Dr. Jens Robert Schöndube
  • Dipl.-Kfm. Tim Hensel
  • Dr. Stefan Kupfer
  • M.Sc. Nicola Bethmann
  • Prof. Dr. Christian Lukas
  • Sebastian Oelrich, M.Sc.

Letzte Änderung: 08.06.2023 - Ansprechpartner: Webmaster